The dense network of EU law and policy on agricultural biotechnology and GMOs is now widely considered to be the world's most comprehensive and stringent regulatory regime. Yet, upon closer inspection a regulatory gap can be identified at the heart of the regime. Contrary to the overall trend of growing centralization and increasingly exhaustive harmonization in EU GMO regulation generally, the cultivation of GM-crops has been left largely un-regulated at EU-level. This legislative lacuna creates the anomaly of a regime that allows for authorization of GM crops for EU-wide cultivation, and sets harmonized, qualitative end-of-cycle requirements for the final cultivated products, yet which fails to provide any substantive prescriptions for how the cultivation of these GM crops alongside existing non-GM counterparts should be operationalized in order to meet these very objectives or, vitally, for who will bear responsibility in the event of adversities.
INTRODUCTION
The spectacular speed and efficiency at which the science and commercialization of agricultural biotechnology developed in the last few decades have presented complex legal and political challenges to regulators worldwide. The European Union (EU) 1 legal order is a case in point. Despite longstanding priority status on European political agendas for genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in the food and agriculture sectors, and notwithstanding a longstanding commitment to a 'precautious' approach, nearly two decades of efforts to formulate a framework of adequately comprehensive and effective regulatory oversight have failed to produce the desired results; both in terms of the uptake of GM-crops, and in terms of appeasing the considerable opposition to GMOs that prevails throughout Europe.
Complexities including persistent political divergence among Member States and EU bodies, public distrust and consumer resistance fuelled by sensationalist media, and a struggling global competitiveness position, have frustrated the EU's regulatory efforts since their inception (e.g. Meins 2003; Bernauer 2003; Toke 2004 ).
Under these pressures, the initial EU regulatory framework collapsed in the late1990s, in a process which culminated in the de facto moratorium on new GMOauthorizations. In the wake of this disintegration, major legislative revisions were undertaken. By 2004, the European Commission declared regime overhaul completed and proceeded to unilaterally lift the moratorium. Moreover, it resumed the authorization-process for the controversial cultivation of GM-crops, despite unrelenting political divide between Member States. Under the comitology procedure, the Commission is empowered to break the impasse in GMO authorizations by legal default.
With this re-opening of the EU internal market to GMOs, the agbiotech regulatory regime will be put to the test once again. The question thereby emerges whether this time the revised regime will indeed, as the Commission has proclaimed, prove to be 'complete and effective', so that a repeat of the events leading to the political stalemate of the 1990s, with major global trade and diplomatic fall-out up to the present, can be avoided. Indeed, the dense network of EU law and policy on 1 Anticipating the succession by the European Union of the European Community's legal capacity following the entry into force of the Lisbon Reform Treaty (Article1(3)), for simplicity this paper refers only to EU rather than EC.
agricultural biotechnology and GMOs is now widely considered to be the world's most comprehensive and stringent regulatory regime. Yet, upon closer inspection a regulatory gap can be identified at the heart of the regime, in respect of the cultivation of GM crops. No EU-level legislation exists for this crucial production stage, contrasting the high degree of centralization and detailed harmonization in other areas of the EU's regulation of agricultural biotechnology and its products. This creates the anomaly of a regime that allows for authorization of GM crops for EU-wide cultivation, and sets harmonized, qualitative end-of-cycle requirements for the final cultivated products, yet which fails to provide any substantive prescriptions for how the cultivation of these GM crops alongside existing non-GM counterparts should be operationalized in order to meet these very objectives or, vitally, for who will bear responsibility in the event of adversities. The now more imminent than ever commercial-scale cultivation of GM-crops on EU soil emphasizes this legislative lacuna. As a result of GM-labelling requirements and the prevailing public opposition to GMOs in the EU, there is both a regulatory need and a market demand for differentiation and segregation between the GM and various non-GM (including organic) agriculture/food production and supply-chains. The type of measures required to attain this objective are known within the EU GMO-regulation discourse as 'coexistence' measures; essentially entailing ex ante technical-agronomic isolation and segregation measures and ex post liability and redress regulations to ensure that GM-crop cultivation will be able to 'peacefully coexist' with established non-GMO practices of, mainly, conventional and organic farming. However, despite its pivotal importance and role in the overall EU agbiotech regime, the definition and interpretation of the policy concept of 'coexistence' remain complex and contentious. The sparse references to it in EU legislation are worded vaguely and ambiguously enough to allow both proponents and critics of agbiotech to rely on coexistence to buttress their arguments for either restrictive or permissive legal contexts for the cultivation of GM-crops. However, notwithstanding the high degree of polarization in the GMO discourse, both proponents and critics now widely accept that total isolation of transgenic material is practically impossible, and that some level of admixture will inevitably occur. Moreover, in view of the novel complexities raised by the concurrent cultivation of GM and non-GM agricultural- 2 Other examples include various identity-preserved and specialty crops, either with voluntary certification or with protected status under EU law.
crops, against the background of the EU's guiding principles of safeguarding the freedom of choice for farmers and consumers and the ability to produce and consume both GMO and GMO-free products without compromising intra-community free trade, it is now broadly agreed that coexistence is 'not an issue that can simply be left to the market, but that it requires some form of organization, if not government regulation' (Lee 2008a: 196) . Distinctly less consensual and straightforward, however, are the questions of who should regulate coexistence, and how.
This paper will analyze how these two questions are being answered in the EU at present, and how the central regulatory gap of coexistence policy is currently being filled. The aim of this paper is to deliver a constructive critique of the emerging policy framework, with a particular focus on the principles of legitimacy and proportionality.
These issues will be explored in this paper in the following structure: following this introduction, Section 2 will succinctly frame the regulatory context and elucidate the centrality of the regulatory gap of coexistence. Section 3 will briefly outline the type of issues and measures that coexistence policy involves, and illustrate why it forms a vital missing element in the current EU regulatory framework. Section 4 will examine how the regulatory gap of coexistence is currently being filled in the EU, characterized by an ongoing struggle between the fundamentally competing EUpolicy paradigms of subsidiarity and harmonization. In the concluding section, the paper makes recommendations towards policy revisions to overcome these pressing dilemmas.
REGULATORY CONTEXT: THE EU AGBIOTECH REGIME
The body of EU law and policy on agbiotech has been gradually expanding since the adoption of the first legislative framework acts in 1990. Yet, this expansion has occurred in a rather piecemeal fashion, lacking a forward-looking, strategic approach towards a comprehensive, integral regime (Etty 2007b; Etty 2007c) . The result has been a patchwork of laws, requiring continuous updating and revision, both to fill loopholes and to catch-up with the rapid developments in the science and commercialization of agbiotech. Following the collapse of this patchwork by the end of the 1990s, a rigorous regime-overhaul was undertaken in the early 2000's.
Although the resulting dense network of EU legislative acts is now widely considered to be the world's most comprehensive and stringent regulatory agbiotech regime, upon closer inspection a selective legislative focus can be identified that has pervaded the EU's regulatory interventions since their inception over two decades ago.
This selective focus may be elucidated by illustrating the product cycle for agricultural biotechnology commodities (seeds, crops, consumer produce) as a threestage chain, with a concomitant three-prong system of regulatory oversight. Within the EU legal context, three major regulatory stages may be distinguished in this product-cycle: (i) Authorization, (ii) Cultivation, and (iii) Market Distribution (Etty 2007a) . 3 Since applications of biotechnology span across all these stages, from seedling to final (consumer) product, it would appear logical that any legal regime with the objective of regulating this technology should equally span this entire product-cycle. Moreover, since authorized agbiotech products can circulate freely throughout the entire EU internal market, the scope of regulatory control should, ideally, match the scope of the respective market in all its stages (Bernauer 2003: 174) . However, an analysis of past, present and pending EU laws and policies demonstrates that the current regime is principally directed at regulating the initial (Authorization) and final (Distribution) stages of this cycle (Etty 2007b Essentially, the starting point for coexistence policy in the EU is the guiding principle of safeguarding the freedom of choice for farmers and consumers and the ability to produce and consume both GM or GM-free products, without compromising intracommunity free trade (Commission 2003: Recitals 2 and 3). In order to safeguard and facilitate the practical choice between GM and non-GM, the EU has introduced relatively stringent GM labelling and traceability requirements, which necessitate differentiation and segregation between the respective supply chains. This is a crucial difference between the European approach to coexistence and its manifestation in most other jurisdictions; not only is there a market demand for products designated as 'non-GM' or 'GM-free' due to consumer scepticism that prevails in most of Europe, the EU's labelling requirements in conjunction with the principle that the various farming methods must not be mutually exclusive have also created a regulatory need for differentiation and segregation between the GM and various non-GM (including organic) agriculture/food production and supply-chains, for which coexistence policy is a prerequisite. Another major difference between the EU and other major jurisdictions is that, to date, Europe has not had any meaningful experience with wide-scale commercial cultivation of GM-crops, making most of the European territory a de facto 'GMO-free zone'. Evidently, this stands in stark contrast with the longstanding agricultural reality in, e.g., North America, where the uptake of GM crops has long been widespread and where, as a corollary, the 'coexistence' between GMO and non-GMO farming has been a fait accompli for nearly two decades. As discussed above, the EU has put in place a relatively stringent and extensive system of regulatory controls for pre-and post-authorization risk assessment and risk management of GMOs. If all GM crops were to be (re)produced in contained environments, such as laboratories or secured greenhouses, these post-introduction risk management measures and identification, labelling, and product tracing systems might work perfectly to mitigate any (residual) risks, as there would be little or no possibility for the GMO crops to be mixed or interact with nearby (non-GMO) crops or other elements of their surrounding environment. However, the characteristic for most farming is that it occurs in an open-environment setting with minimal, if any, opportunity for physical containment. Therefore, some level of commingling or admixture is an inherent part of the everyday reality of farming. The only plausible way to minimize such unwanted admixture is through the implementation of spatial and/or temporal isolation measures, to mitigate out-crossing or natural crosspollination by wind or insects, or comingling as a result of so-called GM 'volunteers' surviving into subsequent growing seasons. Such isolation measures might take the form of, inter alia, minimum growing distances and buffer zones between GMO and non-GMO field plots (spatial), or coordinating and diversifying growing schedules, pollination times, and crop rotations between sexually compatible plants (temporal).
In addition, measures would need to be taken to ensure the segregation and monitoring of the different product flows and supply chains, throughout all stages of sowing, harvesting, storage, transport, processing, and distribution. One further potentially effective measure, which is increasingly discussed, is (highly) restrictive the source of damage will be particularly onerous in GMO cases involving multiple potential sources (e.g. where more than one neighbouring field is planted with the same GM crop), and long time-lapses (with long-term effects potentially materializing only years or decades after the cultivation/release), cumulative effects, and lack of baseline data of the state of the damaged properties, environment, and biodiversity.
Moreover, the GMO-operators, producers, and distributors are typically much better placed and informed to assess and control the potential damaging effects than would be the injured parties. Possible solutions to these challenges include the relaxation or even reversal of the burden of proof, presumption of causation or fault, and joint-andseveral liability, meaning that each potential source of the damage, e.g. several neighbouring GMO farmers, can be held individually and/or jointly liable for the full amount. This can be a crucial benefit to injured parties in the event of difficulties to isolate a single source, or where not all of the potential sources offer sufficient financial resources to provide full compensation. By contrast, with proportionate liability, each defendant is only responsible for its own damage, or the proportionate share of the total damage. Stricto sensu, proportionate liability appears to be the most consistent with the polluter-pays principle, 13 but joint-and-several liability offers crucial additional protection for injured parties that might be warranted by the unique complexities involved in cases of GMO-damage. Another solution, in the absence of insurance coverage for GMO damages, could be the establishment of collective funds to compensate or remediate (collective) damages.
Hence, it is clear that liability and redress provisions are closely linked to various aspects of the coexistence conundrum. Their relevance might range from ex ante preventive and ex post remedial functions. Aside from their potential to mitigate and redistribute the possible costs and damages caused by coexistence problems, liability provisions could also promote responsible and prudent behaviour by all stakeholders involved and provide powerful incentives for adherence to agreed 'good agricultural practices', since non-compliance with such (formally established) norms will normally be considered faulty or negligent conduct, giving grounds to liability.
In view of these complex dilemmas raised by the concurrent cultivation of GM and non-GM agricultural crops, in conjunction with the EU's guiding principles of 13 Article 174(2) EC Treaty.
safeguarding the freedom of choice for farmers and consumers and the ability to produce and consume both GMO or GMO-free products (Commission 2003: Recitals 2 and 3), without compromising intra-community free trade, it is now broadly accepted that coexistence is 'not an issue that can simply be left to the market, but that it requires some form of organization, if not government regulation' (Lee 2008a: 196) . Distinctly less consensual and straightforward, however, is the question of who should regulate coexistence, and how.
FILLING THE GAP OF COEXISTENCE

What Level of Regulatory Intervention?
The answer to these questions, of how coexistence should be regulated and by whom, has to date largely revolved around the classic EU-polity dichotomy of subsidiarity versus harmonization. The EU coexistence policy-design debate has from the outset been pervaded with conflict and competition over legislative competence and responsibility. The determination of the appropriate forum for regulatory intervention for coexistence is not straightforward, and is giving rise to much confusion and contention.
Solid arguments can be made in favour of either of the fundamentally competing paradigms of subsidiarity versus harmonization, or decentralization or 'Europeanization'. For example, one the one hand, as an element of agricultural policy, and having potential for substantial internal market implications, to regulate coexistence at EU-level appears logical, if not necessary. With the political attitudes towards GM crops diverging so widely among the Member States, a significant degree of variation is to be expected. In other policy areas such fragmentation often rationalizes an EU-level approach, with a view to safeguarding the internal market.
Conversely, these divergent views on GM crops are particularly strongly held because coexistence tends to be seen as closely connected to, if not an element of, risk regulation and the politically contentious issue of GMO governance generally. For these sensitive policy sectors Member States tend to feel more passionate about retaining a degree of national control than for the also connected more ethically and emotionally neutral areas of internal market and agricultural policy. Concomitantly, given how fraught with conflict and delays the past decision-making on GMOs has been, a highly centralized EU-level approach to coexistence might be difficult, if not impossible to attain. Practically speaking, a national, regional, or even local approach to at least the technical agronomic aspects of coexistence could offer tailor-made solutions to fit the widely diverging conditions throughout the European geography, in terms of climate, ecology, and differences in farm sizes and structures (ranging from very small family farms to large, industrial-type agri-businesses), etc. Then again, such agronomic differences do not necessarily rationalize a decentralized approach to other aspects of coexistence, including purity standards, baseline 'best practices' for segregation and monitoring different product flows and supply chains at least in the post-harvest stage, liability and redress provisions, etc. Also from an internal market perspective, such issues might be best addressed in concert, creating at least an EU-level regulatory floor. From a policy-coherence and consistency perspective, there is also much to be said for a harmonized, EU-level approach. As argued above, coexistence policy is a crucial missing link in the EU's regulatory regime for agricultural biotechnology, and forms a central regulatory gap in the context of a highly centralized and increasingly exhaustively harmonized framework.
Also, coexistence policy is closely linked to pivotal legal concepts in the overall regime (of which some examples are elaborated below), that risk becoming unenforceability or even redundant in the absence of harmonized coexistence policy; therefore, a failure to fill the regulatory gap of coexistence within the context of and coherent with the extensively harmonized and centralized overall framework would threaten to undermine the effectiveness and legitimacy of the EU's overall agbiotech regime (Etty 2007b) . Regulatory consistency arguments also support concerted action,
given that a subsidiarity-based approach to coexistence would constitute a considerable departure from prior policy design, both in substance and in form. Prior to the emergence of coexistence on the political agenda, there was a clear and increasing trend of 'Europeanization' and centralization in the EU's governance of GMOs. After a brief initial period of relatively minimal harmonization (creating a regulatory 'floor' but no 'ceiling'), the regulatory mode quickly shifted to increasingly exhaustive harmonization, with almost complete pre-emptive effect on national regulation. The same trend can be observed in procedural terms, as the regulatory instrument of choice in the area of biotechnology has shifted from (framework) Directives to Regulations, the most direct and true form of 'European' legislation.
All of these (and other) considerations are feeding into a complex and confusing composition of coexistence policy in the EU.
Subsidiarity versus Harmonization
During the negotiations for the EU's major agbiotech regime reform, in the early 2000s, the EU institutions and advisory bodies, the Member States, and a diverse range of stakeholders, held widely diverging views on the appropriate site, level, and extent of regulatory intervention for coexistence. In particular the EP and the Commission clashed over coexistence in the context of the co-decision procedures on the reform regulations package (Levidow & Boschert 2008: 181) . The EP argued that a harmonized and stringent EU-level coexistence policy was vital to completing the EU's legislative framework for GMOs. The Commission rebutted that coexistence provisions could not be accommodated within the existing legislative framework since the cultivation of GM crops was not considered to present environmental or health concerns. It deemed coexistence a 'purely economic issue' that should be kept separate from the GMO authorization and risk management regime under revision (Fischler 2003) . However, this distinction soon became blurred by the political compromise that was ultimately struck. A provision was adopted within the context of the regime, in the Deliberate Release Directive, providing an explicit statutory division of competences for coexistence policy, stipulating that: Indeed, these risks appear to be materializing in the emerging multi-level governance constellation for coexistence policy in the EU.
A leading role in this process has been assumed by the Commission, though not attributed by the legislation. The impetus for the Commission's alternative governance approach was the dilemma it faced of having concrete and explicit conceptions of how coexistence should be regulated and how detrimental effects for the internal market of wide-ranging diversity in Member States' policies should be
avoided, yet at the same time lacking the formal competence to undertake such regulation unilaterally, while the EU legislative route of co-decision was also blocked by the obstacles of political stalemate in the Council and a relatively GMO-critical Parliament. To overcome this dilemma, it appears that in the absence of formal (and (politically usable) rule-making powers the Commission has turned to more flexible and informal governance modes, seeking to attain the same objectives. While maintaining its de jure resistance to accept legislative responsibility for initiating harmonization of coexistence at EU-level through the 'classic' Community Method, at the same time, de facto, the Commission nonetheless appears to be employing a more subtle, 'softer' and less direct method of influence towards convergence, at its own terms, yet with the appearance of 'multi-level/new' governance.
Open Method of Coordination?
On the face of it, this EU governance framework for coexistence most resembles an 'Open Method of Coordination' (OMC) procedure. However, upon closer inspection this semblance may prove deceiving. In ideal-type, the OMC is a 'new', multi-level governance mode par excellence, with its experimental 'soft' governance approach based on iterative benchmarking of national progress towards common (European) objectives through a bottom-up process of mutual information, feedback and peer review, monitoring and benchmarking, allowing comparison and adjustment; but meanwhile allowing the main competences to be retained by the Member States (e.g. Zeitlin 2005: 3; Trubek et al. 2005: 18-20) . Since its inception as a tool for the coordination of national economic and especially employment policies, the OMC has been embraced as a new and broadly applicable EU governance instrument by the and fragmentation, and extended to cover an enormous range of policy fields. In theory, the contentious policy issue of coexistence could be one of those fields for which an OMC-type governance might be ideally suited (cf. Sabel & Zeitlin 2007) . By providing a multi-level, non-hierarchical, reflexive, 'soft' framework that facilitates mutual learning, spreads good practices and, perhaps most importantly, by accommodating diversity while at the same time fostering convergence toward commonly agreed EU goals, it could bridge, or at least narrow, the gap between subsidiarity and harmonization.
However, a closer examination of the EU coexistence governance framework reveals that fundamental anomalies in the practical arrangements and the application of this OMC-type process stand in the way of it attaining its reconciliatory potential.
Networked Multi-level Governance?
A vital element for a successful OMC-process is a forum for deliberation and mutual learning and adjustment, and to develop best practices. In the EU coexistence A prerequisite for the effective functioning of such networks and expert bodies within the OMC-context are common goals, guidelines and benchmarks. According to the OMC ideal-type, and consistent with the principles of multi-level governance, the mutual learning and convergence in this network or forum should work towards, and on the basis of, commonly and consultatively agreed objectives for collaboration towards common 'European' goals. This is where the anomalies of the OMC-type process in coexistence governance become evident: EU legislation does not provide any democratically adopted objectives specific to coexistence, nor have any such goals been agreed by the Member States in a more 'soft', informal setting (e.g. at the non-legislative level of the European Council). As for the possible agreement of common objectives by the COEX-NET itself, the Commission has stressed explicitly that the network is not intended to develop a harmonized approach to coexistence or to scrutinize individual domestic measures.
'Soft' De Facto Harmonization
Instead, the 'common' goals have been formulated in a top-down, quasi- (though stricto sensu not in legal terms). As these outputs are currently conceived within the narrowly defined limits promulgated by the Commission, the result of this networking exercise may simply be a conversion of the Commission's unilateral, centralized standards into an seemingly 'legitimatized' form of 'soft harmonization', and hence reinforce centralization (cf. Lee 2010).
Ex Ante Pre-emption and Ex Post Correction
Aside from its role in this OMC-type, multi-level networking arrangement, the Commission's narrow conceptualization of coexistence and its strict distinction between economic and all other impacts, has had an ex ante pre-emptive effect on
Member States' domestic coexistence policies. Since the Recommendation was adopted after the agreement of Article 26a, but prior to its formal adoption and entry into force, it served to circumscribe national autonomy from the very outset; before most Member States had even begun to define the parameters of their domestic coexistence policies, and in fact even before they had been formally mandated to do so.
In addition, the Recommendation also has an ex post 'corrective' function, to discipline domestic regulations after they have been drafted. Since coexistence measures constitute technical regulations concerning products, and as such have the potential to distort internal market trade, they must be notified in draft form to the Commission and the other Member States before being adopted into national law. The The most notably and recurrent substantive example is the Commission's consistent practice of objecting to national coexistence measures that apply stringent purity targets, or even an effective 'zero tolerance' to GM presence in non-GM products (setting the target for preventive measures at the 'technical zero' of 0.1% impurity). In this respect, the Commission applies a particularly restrictive proportionality-test for coexistence measures in the TRIS procedure by directly linking its economic framing of coexistence to the labelling exception thresholds for GMOs.
Though an in-depth analysis of this practice and its problems exceeds the scope threshold. This would deprive the pivotal concept of 'adventitious presence' of its (intended) meaning in the overall regulatory framework, and effectively render it redundant. What is more, aside from theoretical legal rationalizations, the prevalence of 'real world' contractual obligations to deliver agricultural commodities at the 0.1% purity level would appear to negate the Commission's policy stance.
In procedural terms, this interpretation of the labelling exception and its transformation into a de minimis threshold for regulatory intervention on coexistence and a benchmark for the proportionality of Member States' policies, does not find a basis in 'hard law', but merely in the Commission's 'soft law' framework established by Recommendation. In fact, it can be argued that the Commission's 'soft' policy stance that there is no legal basis for national coexistence measures that aim to 'avoid' GMO-traces in non-GMO products more completely than the 0.9% trigger for the labelling requirements is in direct contradiction with (the literal wording of) the 'hard law' mandate that the EP and Council Directive has provided Member States in Article 26a.
CONCLUDING REMARKS: MOVING BEYOND SUBSIDIARITY vs.
HARMONIZATION TOWARDS 'SYNERGETIC GOVERNANCE'
The above discussion of procedural and substantive aspects of the Commission's strategy to govern coexistence demonstrates a clear discrepancy between its de jure insistence on subsidiarity (along with its resistance to a formal EU-level This approach of 're-Europeanization', blurs the lines of autonomy, authority, and accountability, and raises serious questions about its transparency and legitimacy.
In fact, in its current form the Commission's approach appears to run counter both to its own official policy, ECJ case-law, and primary EU law. to the well-known criticisms of the democratic deficit and legitimacy crisis of the EU generally, exacerbated by the recent constitutional struggles.
In view of all this, it is clear that the Commission's experimentalist approach involving 'new' and 'multi-level' governance instruments has not succeeded in bridging the divide between the conflicting paradigms of subsidiarity and harmonization, and that competition for authority for coexistence is ongoing.
Therefore, at first glance the conclusion might logically be drawn that multi-level governance has failed in the coexistence context. It would be wrong, however, to attribute this failure to the introduction of these governance techniques per se, and to assume (as some scholars have done) that coexistence lends itself only to centralized, 'hard' regulation.
Instead, more detailed analysis of this governance framework (as initiated in this paper) demonstrates that it is the anomalies in the arrangement and application of these governance features have undermined their potential for reconciliation as well as their legitimacy, and as a result have let coexistence fall between two regulatory stools.
Therefore, it is here submitted that the solution to the coexistence governance conundrum need not involve a complete uprooting or reinvention of the current framework, based on exclusive choices between either subsidiarity or harmonization, de-central or central oversight, and 'classic hard regulation' or 'soft new governance'.
Instead, to remove the regulatory gap of coexistence policy, these competing 'regulatory stools' between which coexistence threatens to fall must be slid closely together, from the current arrangement of opposition to a juxtaposed, adjoined setting, thereby creating a more broad and stable platform for coexistence policy to rest on. In essence, then, the recommendation this papers aims to make is that the discrepancy between the Commission's formal, de jure position and its de facto practice should be removed, by legalizing and legitimizing the current de facto harmonization strategy through a more genuine multi-level governance approach. To be clear, the point is not whether coexistence policy should be more or less stringent than currently defined by the Commission, but rather that whatever the parameters for coexistence in the EU might be in future, they should be legitimized with a basis in While it would certainly be naïve to suggest that the negotiation and adoption of harmonized baseline coexistence parameters will be an easy task given the persisting deep political divide on GMO-issues, clearly this cannot not a priori justify infringements of the basic principles of legitimacy, accountability, and consistency in lawmaking. Likewise, an obvious criticism of the recommendations in this paper might be that renegotiation of coexistence is likely, again, to lead to delays and policy inertia, with the risk of further world trade law implications. However, it is submitted that it would be equally naïve to think that the current framework left unchanged would not produce similar ramifications. As long as coexistence is not legitimately resolved (in terms of its conceptualization and governance structure) and the competition for authority remains ongoing, with de facto harmonization on the basis of a 'soft' policy instrument of the Commission, this unrest will (continue to) spillover into the troubles in the overall GMO governance in the EU, and fuel decisionmaking gridlock in the authorization process, as several Member States continue to directly link these issues. In this respect, it should be recalled that Member States' dissatisfaction with GMO regulation has brought the EU regime to its knees before. If conflict over coexistence continues, this risk is likely to recur.
In view of all of this, it is here submitted that the legitimate and viable regulation of coexistence in the EU requires moving beyond the dichotomy of subsidiarity versus harmonization towards 'synergetic governance', combining both these paradigms as mutually reinforcing components of a concerted effort to fill the regulatory gap of coexistence so as to realize a comprehensive, consistent, and viable regulatory regime for agricultural biotechnology in the EU.
